Reuters published an article titled “Mexican ruling party insiders fear embattled president a liability.” In what has to be the best distillation of the PRI ever printed, PRI lawmaker Francisco Arroyo, deputy speaker of the lower house, states:
“We have a serious problem perception-wise nationally about levels of government corruption.”
Indeed, from the PRI’s perspective, the problem isn’t that there is massive corruption, but rather that the public is on to them! I wonder if Congressman Arroyo knew just how telling that statement was.
Wow. Mexico screwed up and let the PRI back in power and they are getting just what they must have wanted.
At a press event where EPN introduced a member of his presidential transition team as the new anti-corruption investigator for the issue of the houses he and he wife obtained from government contractors, EPN didn’t get far enough away from the microphone at the end before complaining about the lack of applause.
Though not very grammatically elegant, “Ya se que no aplauden” is a trending hashtag on twitter and is emblematic of the bizarrely disconnected EPN regime.
Here’s an amazing photo from the event:
and some reactions from Mexico:
“I want you to investigate what this other hand did”
The Latin American Herald Tribune posted an interesting piece the other day with the awesome headline “Anti-Corruption Campaign Reduces Interest in Civil Service in China.”
I guess that’s one way to gauge how well the anti-corruption campaign is working, although there are clearly other factors at work. There were 22,000 government jobs available this year and 1.4 million people enrolled to take an exam to try to get one of those jobs. This is down from 2013 numbers, which were also lower than 2012 figures by 130,000 test takers. Despite the decrease in test takers, I would say that the demand for civil service work is still pretty competitive!
President Xi has worked to make high posts less attractive, by reducing benefits such as “unnecessary banquets, gifts, first-class flights and other perks.”
While the official media is using the decrease to highlight the efficacy of the anti-corruption campaign, there are some other factors which should be noted. For instance, to qualify for some of the jobs, test takers must now have 2 years of experience at a post higher than the provincial level. Also, the article notes that “Over the past few years the duties of civil servants and senior officials have toughened to such an extent that some have died of exhaustion or committed suicide due to stress.” Wow, that’s not what you usually think of when you think of the civil service. That has to discourage potential job seekers!
A student in my Mexico class came across this video and I decided to share it because I thought it was powerful and well done. The video is short (~4 minutes) and is acted completely by kids. In it, they show the myriad problems plaguing Mexican society today. At the end, they say that if their future will be like the one portrayed in the video, they don’t want it. I cannot explain exactly why, but having the kids act out the problems gave me goose bumps. It is in Spanish but you don’t need to speak it to understand the message.
There has been some great work in the last couple of years investigating the long-run effects of Spanish colonialism on Latin American development. Melissa Dell’s “The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita” is one example (it was published in Econometrica but here is a working paper version).
I just learned of another interesting working paper on this general topic. The author is Jenny Guardado R. and the piece is called “Office-Selling, Corruption and Long-term Development in Peru.” I haven’t read it yet but it’s moving to the top of my pile. Here’s the (rather long) abstract:
This paper investigates the private returns to colonial offices and how these influence long-term economic and political outcomes across sub-national provinces in Peru. Exploiting exogenous variation in the needs of Spanish monarchs to sell offices due to fiscal emergencies induced by European wars and employing a unique dataset of the prices at which they sold them, I show how rates paid for colonial offices exhibit a pattern consistent with rent- seeking. In particular, positions with greater access to rents from agriculture and to gains from trade monopolies exhibit differentially higher prices than others. A closer look at the mechanisms behind these results reveals that when faced with a trade-off between revenue and quality of colonial officials, the Crown generally chose the former. The result was a decline in the ability of the Spanish monarch to monitor and enforce colonial policy limiting rent-seeking. I then present evidence demonstrating that these activities exerted negative influences on development over the long run. Specifically, provinces with highly valued offices in the 18th century today have higher poverty rates, lower public good provision and lower household consumption. One reason why the effects of rent-seeking persisted is through political conflict: provinces with highly valued offices also exhibited frequent anti-colonial rebellions, heightened anti-government violence and a deep-seated mistrust of politicians and democracy today. These results suggest that corruption have negative lasting consequences for economic development by exacerbating political conflicts.
h/t Justin Sandefur
Blogging by Boz has an interesting post about rooting out corruption in the Mexican police force. He notes that the government had set a goal to vet all of the police in the country but so far has only vetted 75% of the force. I’m not sure when this goal was originally set, because 75% actually seems quite high to what I would expect. There have been inevitable delays and some unfortunate unintended consequences. Here are a few that Boz lists:
1. “Can they define “corruption”? There is a difference between a cop who takes bribes to let drivers out of traffic tickets and a cop who takes bribes to ignore extortion by cartels. The tests have allegedly been far better at finding the former than the latter.
2. Fired police have been recruited by criminal groups. In one particularly awful example in Jalisco, a fired police officer was working as a sicario for a cartel killing other police officers less than two weeks after he was removed from duty. If firing police simply increases the ranks and skills of criminal groups in certain states, that’s not a good policy. These fired officers need an opportunity and training to obtain an honest job.
3. Continued corruption. Even after these tests have taken place, there have been incidents of police who passed the tests working for criminal groups, sometimes in the role of kidnappers. That has harmed the population’s confidence in the testing process.”
Boz concludes by making the excellent argument that vetting is (1) hard to scale effectively; and (2) something that must be done continuously and not just a one-time deal.